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1 Introduction
The last few years have witnessed a rapid growth of papers devoted to social and
economic networks. A subset of those papers have focussed on stability and eﬃciency
and the conflict between them. Stable networks refer to those networks which once
formed will be immune to further changes. The formation process itself is sometimes
left unspecified. Eﬃcient networks are those which maximize a social welfare function
that is a sum of the utility or payoﬀ functions of individuals. It is well documented
there is a general conflict between stability and eﬃciency, namely, in many settings
stable networks are not necessarily eﬃcient and eﬃcient networks are not necessarily
stable.
The notion of stability is itself not uniquely defined but depend on what coor-
dination possibilities are available to players or individuals. The existing models of
network formation have focussed on two ends of a coordination spectrum. On one
hand they have focussed on individual and pairwise solution concepts such as pair-
wise stability (see Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)) and strong pairwise stability (see
Chakrabarti and Gilles (2007)). On the other hand, they have assumed complete
coordination with the result being any arbitrary coalition including the grand coali-
tion can freely form and members can alter the structure of links in the coalition (see
Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005)).
In the real world very often, we can get intermediate levels of coordination re-
sulting in formation of coalitions which are relatively small (smaller than the grand
coalition) but at the same time bigger than a coalition of 1. Therefore, from both a
mathematical point of view as well as an economic one, such coalition formation is
of interest and this is the subject of the present paper. Stable networks of order 
where  is a natural number refer to those networks that are immune to coalitional
deviation of size  or less. In this paper, we introduce stability of a finite order and
examine its relation with eﬃcient networks.
The main objective is to identify specific classes of value functions where the con-
flict between stability of a certain order and eﬃciency is resolved. The focus of this
paper is on the architecture based resolution of the conflict, namely, we investigate
shapes of networks such that if eﬃcient networks take those shapes, they are neces-
sarily stable, and if stable networks take those shapes, they are necessarily eﬃcient.
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The question of network topologies or shapes or architectures for which there is no
conflict between stability and eﬃciency may be significant. If there are a vast number
of such networks and one is looking for networks which are simultaneously stable and
eﬃcient, one may first focus on those topologies for which there is no conflict between
stability and eﬃciency under reasonable assumptions.
We shall pursue the transferable utility framework introduced by Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996). Under this framework, the network produces a certain value as
defined by a value function which in turn is allocated among the players based on
an allocation rule which determines the payoﬀs of the players. An example of such a
framework would be, for instance, airline code-sharing, where the passenger embark-
ing on a long distance flight pays an up-front fee which is distributed among airlines
participating in the code-sharing network.
We assume that the value function follows certain well-known properties like
anonymity and component additivity (see below for formal definitions) and focus
on a certain allocation rule that has been popular in the literature, namely, the
component-wise egalitarian allocation rule. Anonymity implies that value function
only depends on the shape of the network and not the labels of the players. A com-
ponent is a subnetwork where there is a path between any two players and no path
from a player within the component to a player outside the component. Component
additivity assumes away externalities across components. The component-wise egal-
itarian allocation rule divides the value produced by a component equally across the
members of a component. These assumptions are undoubtedly strong and may not
hold in real world settings but may serve as a starting point before we analyze more
complicated networks.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the notation and
terminology. In Section 3 we impose the assumption of component additivity on value
functions and under the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule, we look at that
the configuration of eﬃciency compatible network architectures, by which we mean
network shapes which ensure that if eﬃcient networks assume those shapes, they are
necessarily stable with no further restrictions on value functions. In Section 4, we
impose the additional assumption of anonymity and we look at network architectures
under which the conflict between stability of a certain order and eﬃciency is resolved.
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We find a broad class of architectures for which stable networks of a certain order are
necessarily eﬃcient subject to existence of both stable and eﬃcient networks which
assume those architectures. Section 5 concludes.
2 Modelling Principles
2.1 Networks
In this section we define the formal elements to describe network formation along
with some concepts borrowed from graph theory. Let  = {1 2     } be a finite
set of players. A coalition refers to any subset of the player set and the size of a
coalition is the number of players in that coalition. Two distinct players   ∈ 
with  6=  are linked if  and  are related in some capacity. Usually we think of such
links as economically productive relationships between players. These relationships
are undirected in the sense that the two players forming a relationship are equals
within that relationship. We do not rule out that these relationships have spillover
eﬀects on the productive relations between other players.
Formally, an (undirected) link between  and  is defined as the set { }. Through-
out we use the shorthand notation  to denote the link { }. It should be clear that
 is completely equivalent to .
In total there are 1
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(− 1) potential links on the player set  . The collection of
these potential links on  is denoted by
 = { |   ∈  and  6= }  (1)
A network  is now defined as any collection of links  ⊂  . The collection of
all networks on  is denoted by G = { |  ⊂ }. The collection G consists
of 2
1
2
(−1) networks. The network  consisting of all links is called the complete
network on  and the network 0 = ∅ consisting of no links is the empty network
on  .
Let  :  →  be a permutation on  . For every network  ∈ G the cor-
responding permutation is denoted by  = {()() |  ∈ } ∈ G . Two net-
works   ∈ G have the same topology or architecture if there exists a permutation
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 :  →  such that  = . This is denoted as  ∼ . For  ∈ G the corre-
sponding network topology is denoted by  = { ∈ G |  ∼ }. Clearly a network
topology is a mathematical equivalence class with regard to the binary relationship
∼. It is obvious that the collection of all networks G is partitioned into network
topologies.
For every network  ∈ G and every player  ∈  we denote ’s neighborhood in 
by () = { ∈  |  6=  and  ∈ }. Player  therefore is participating in the links
in her link set () = { ∈  |  ∈ ()} ⊂ . We also define () = ∪∈()
and let () = #() with the convention that if () = ∅, we let () = 1.1Also,
() = #() () will be referred to as size of the network .
A path in  connecting  and  is a set of distinct players {1 2     } ⊂ ()
with  > 2 such that 1 = ,  = , and {12 23     −1} ⊂ . We say  and 
are connected to each other if a path exists between them and they are disconnected
otherwise. The network 0 ⊂  is a component of  if for all  ∈ (0) and  ∈ (0),
 6= , there exists a path in 0 connecting  and  and for any  ∈ (0) and  ∈ (),
 ∈  implies  ∈ 0. In other words, a component is simply a maximally connected
subnetwork of . We denote the set of network components of the network  by ().
For any component  ∈ () the cardinality of () is the size of .
The set of players that are not connected in the network  are collected in the set
of (fully) disconnected players in  denoted by
0() =  \() = { ∈  | () = ∅}
Such players are also known as singletons. Furthermore, we define
Γ() = {() |  ∈ ()} ∪ { {} |  ∈ 0()} (2)
as the partitioning of the player set  based on the component structure of the net-
work . For any  ∈ G ,  ∈ Γ(), let () = ∩ where  = { |   ∈  ⊂  and  6= } 
Namely, () denotes the subgraph of  on the player set .
Sometimes, depending on the context, we refer to a singleton as a null component,
in which case a component as defined above is called a non-null component.
1We emphasize here that if () 6= ∅, we have that () > 2. Namely, in those cases the network
has to consist of at least one link.
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We denote by () be the set of all non-null components of size less than or
equal to . A connected network is one where each pair of players are connected to
each other. In other words, a connected network has one non-null component and no
singletons. A network that is not connected is disconnected.
We shall emphasize certain network topologies. A star network is a connected
network that has all players directly linked to a central player and no two other
players directly linked to each other. A circle is a connected network in which every
player is directly linked to two other players.
A critical player refers to a player who can by deleting a well chosen subset of links
in her neighborhood link set can disconnect at least two other players. A network
that has no critical players is referred to as a bi-connected network.2 A circle, for
instance, is a bi-connected network.
2.2 Value and Allocation
The value function given by  : G → R such that (∅) = 0 expresses the collective
network benefits stemming from a certain network.3 A network value function 
assigns a total benefit () ∈ R to the network  ∈ G . The space of all network
value functions  such that (∅) = 0 is denoted by V . It is clear that V is
a
³
2
1
2
(−1) − 1
´
-dimensional Euclidean vector space. The allocated payoﬀ to an
individual player is determined by an allocation rule  : G × V → R which
determines how the collective value is distributed over the individual players. ( )
is the payoﬀ to player  from the network  under the value function .
Let  ∈ V be some network value function. We consider two fundamental
properties of such a network value function:
• The network value function  is component additive if () = X
∈()
(). Com-
ponent additivity immediately implies that disconnected players  ∈ 0() gen-
erate no value.
2This is a standard graph theoretic term. Gilles et. al. (2006) refer to these as well-connected
networks.
3The notation and terminology has been borrowed from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
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• The network value function  is anonymous if () = () for all permutations
 and networks . Anonymity implies that benefits () depend on the topology
of the network  only.
Next we define some properties of an allocation rule. Recall that  :  →  is a
permutation. Let  be defined by () = ()
• An allocation rule  is anonymous if for any permutation , ()( ) =
( ). Anonymity of the allocation rule simply means payoﬀ of a player
depends solely on the position in the network rather than the label of the
players.
• An allocation rule  is balanced ifX
∈
( ) = () for all  and . Balanced-
ness is a minimal property that will be assumed throughout.
• An allocation rule  is component balanced if X
∈
( ) = () for every 
and  ∈ () and every component additive . It is obvious that component
balance implies balance. Component balance along with component additivity
implies that fully disconnected players in 0() always have an allocated payoﬀ
of zero.
• An allocation rule is component decomposable if ( ) = ( ) for all compo-
nent additive  ∈ V ,  ∈ G ,  ∈ () and  ∈ () Component decompos-
ability requires that if  is component additive, the way that value is allocated
within a component does not depend on the structure of other components.
Let  ∈ V be component additive. The component-wise egalitarian allocation
rule is defined by
  ( ) = ()() (3)
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where  ∈ () such that  ∈ () and   ( ) = ∅ if there is no  ∈ () such
that  ∈ (). Under this rule, the value generated by a component is split equally
among the members of that component. The component-wise egalitarian allocation
rule satisfies anonymity, component balance and component decomposability.
Also, we consider the egalitarian allocation rule defined by
  ( ) = () for all  ∈  (4)
Clearly this allocation rule satisfies anonymity and balance, but not component bal-
ance or component decomposability. In our discussion these two allocation rules are
featured prominently.
2.3 Stability and Eﬃciency
In this section we discuss network formation principles from a link-based perspective.
Central to this approach is that the formation of a link in principle is considered
separately. Each link in the network involves a pair of players. While mutual consent
is required for establishing a link, each player can delete a link unilaterally.
Denote by + , the network obtained by adding link  to the existing network
, i.e.,  +  =  ∪ { }. Similarly,  −  denotes the network that results from
deleting link  from the existing network , i.e.,  −  =  \ {}.
Similarly, denote by  + , the network obtained by adding the link-set  to the
existing network  where  ⊂ \. For  ⊂ , − denotes the network that results
by deleting the link-set  from the existing network .
We introduce three fundamental link formation principles.
• A network  ∈ G is link deletion proof (LDP) if for every player  ∈  and
every neighbor  ∈ (), it holds that (− ) 6 (). Link deletion proof-
ness requires that each individual player has no incentive to sever an existing
link with one of his neighbors.
• A network  ∈ G is strong link deletion proof (SLDP) if for every player  ∈ 
and every link-set  ⊂ (), it holds that ( −  ) 6 ( ). Strong link
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deletion proofness requires that each player has no incentive to sever links with
one or more of his neighbors. Obviously, SLDP implies LDP.
• A network  ∈ G is link addition proof if for all players   ∈  , it holds that
( +  )  ( ) implies ( +  )  ( ). Link addition proofness
states that there are no incentives to form additional links.
These three fundamental stability concepts can be used to define additional sta-
bility concepts. A network  ∈ G is pairwise stable if it is link deletion proof and
link addition proof. Furthermore, a network  ∈ G is strongly pairwise stable if it
is strong link deletion proof and link addition proof.
Next we define certain notions of coalitional stability borrowed from Jackson and
van den Nouweland (2005).
Let  ⊂  be an arbitrary coalition.
• A network 0 ∈ G is obtainable from  ∈ G via link deletion by  if 0 ⊂ 
and  ∈  and  ∈ 0 implies { } ∩  6= ∅.
• A network 0 ∈ G is obtainable from  ∈ G via link addition by  if 0 ⊃ 
and  ∈  and  ∈ 0 implies { } ⊂ 
These definitions reflect the fact that players can delete their links unilaterally but
link addition requires cooperation of both players in question. Of course, coalitions
can engage simultaneously in link addition and link deletion which we refer to as
deviations.
• A network 0 ∈ G is obtainable from  ∈ G via deviations by  if (i)  ∈ 
and  ∈ 0 implies  ∩  6= ∅(ii)  ∈  and  ∈ 0 implies  ⊂ 
• A deviation by  ⊂  is profitable if there exists a network 0 that is obtainable
from  by  via deviation satisfying two properties:
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— (0 ) > ( ) for all  ∈ 
— There exists  ∈  such that (0 )  ( )
Stable networks of order  are those that are immune to profitable deviations by
any coalition of size  or less.
• A network  is link deletion proof (link addition proof) of order  ∈ N (where
1 6  6 ) with respect to allocation rule  and value function  if for any
 ⊂  with || 6 , 0 that is obtainable from  via link deletion (link addition)
by , and  ∈  such that (0 )  ( ), there exists  ∈  such that
(0 )  ( )
• A network  is stable of order  ∈ N (where 1 6  6 ) with respect to
allocation rule  and value function  if for any  ⊂  with || 6 , 0 that is
obtainable from  via deviations by  and  ∈  such that (0 )  ( ),
there exists  ∈  such that (0 )  ( )
Pairwise stability was seminally introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
Strong pairwise stability as defined above has been introduced by Gilles and Sarangi
(2004). A similar concept has been introduced independently by Goyal and Joshi
(2006) as “pairwise Nash equilibrium”. Pairwise Nash equilibria are equivalent to
strong pairwise stability. Strong stability as defined by Jackson and van den Nouwe-
land (2005) is equivalent to stability of order . Any notion of stability of order  is
stronger than the corresponding notion of order − 1 where  > 2. Stability of order
1 is equivalent to SLDP. Stability of order 2 is equivalent to “pairwise strong Nash
equilibrium” as defined by Bloch and Bellafleme (2004).
It is important to note that stability of any order is stronger than link addition
proofness and link deletion proofness of that order combined. In other words, a
network may be both link addition proof and link deletion proof of order  but not
strong stable of order . This is because it may be immune to both link formation
and link deletion but not both simultaneously.
Finally, we define eﬃciency.
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• A network  ∈ G is eﬃcient with respect to value function  if () > (0)
for all 0 ⊂  .
2.4 Cooperative Games and the r-Core
A TU cooperative game is a pair () where  is the set of players, and  : 2 → R
defines the productive value of a coalition, and is called the characteristic function.
Since the player set is fixed, we will simply refer to the characteristic function as a
cooperative game.
An allocation  ∈ R is in the r-core , where  is a natural number less than or
equal to , ifP∈  = () andP∈  > () for all  ⊂  such that || 6 .
The n-core is simply referred to as the core. Obviously, any allocation in the -core
also belongs to the ( − 1)-core.
For the purposes of this paper, we are interested in a special type of cooperative
game, which we denote by . For all  ⊂  ,
() = max⊂ ()
Thus the value of a coalition is the maximum value that the coalition can obtain by
rearranging its members in a network. The anonymity and component additivity of
 implies symmetry and additivity of .
3 Component Additive Value Functions
3.1 Deviation Proof Network Topologies
We will begin by extending the analysis of Gilles et. al. (2006) who show that
under component additive (but not necessarily anonymous) value functions, once
eﬃcient networks take certain shapes (namely, bi-connected graphs), then under  ,
all eﬃcient networks are strongly pairwise stable without any further restrictions on
value functions. This raises the possibility that appropriate architectures can resolve
the conflict between stability and eﬃciency for higher orders of stability. Namely for
stronger notions of stability, there is a wide class of architectures such that if eﬃcient
networks assume those architectures, they are stable without further restrictions on
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value functions. Unfortunately, this is not the case and architecture based resolution
of the conflict cannot be extended to higher orders of stability.
We shall assume only component additivity of value functions in this section but
not anonymity. We shall also restrict ourselves to the component-wise egalitarian
allocation rule. We begin with the definition of inclusive networks.
Definition 1 A network 0 which is obtainable from  by deviation by a coalition
 ⊂  is said to be inclusive of  if for any   ∈ (),  ∈ (), there exists
0 ∈ (0) such that   ∈ (0).
In other words, the deviation would not result in breaking up existing components
into smaller components though it allows the connecting of existing components to
form larger components. So all types link addition is allowed while only those link
deletions are allowed which do not destroy all existing path between any two players.
In Figure 1, 2 is inclusive of 1 while 3 is not because in 3, there is no path between
4 and 5 which were previously connected.
1
32 65
4
g1
1
2 6
4
g2
3 5
1
2
g3
3 5
4
6
Figure 1
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Next we have the following proposition.
Lemma 1 Let  be component additive and  =  . Given an eﬃcient network ,
there does not exist any profitable deviation that yields a network 0 that is inclusive
of 
Proof. Towards a contradiction, suppose there exists a profitable deviation by an
arbitrary coalition  ⊂  that yields a network 0 that is inclusive with regard to
. We begin by showing that there can no player that can be strictly worse oﬀ as a
result of such a deviation.
Consider any arbitrary player  (which may or may not belong to the deviating
coalition ). Let 0 be a component (possibly a null component if  is a singleton)
containing , namely,  ∈ (0) in the network 0. Then there are two possibilities
which we delineate as two cases.
Case 1: (0) ∈ Γ().
Then, given that 0 is inclusive of , there exists a collection of player sets
1 2      ∈ Γ() such that
(0) =
S
=1

Two other conditions have to hold. First,  must belong to one of the sets among
1 2     . Call this set . Second,  must contain at least one member of the
deviating coalition, namely,  ∩  6= ∅. Let  ∈  ∩ .
Since  is a member of the deviating coalition, it must be the case that
  (0 ) >   ( ) (5)
But, both  and  belong to  and (0) Hence,
  ( ) =   ( ); (6)
  (0 ) =   (0 ) (7)
Hence,
  (0 ) >   ( )
Case 2: (0) ∈ Γ().
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Then, there exists  ∈ ()∪0() : () = (0). If ∩(0) = ∅, then 0 = 
and payoﬀs of  remain unchanged from the definition of  . Next let ∩(0) 6= ∅
and let  ∈  ∩(0).
But, both  and  belong to () and (0). Hence,
  ( ) =   ( ); (8)
  (0 ) =   (0 ) (9)
Since  is a member of the deviating coalition, it must be the case that
  (0 ) >   ( ) (10)
From (8) to (10), we get
  (0 ) >   ( )
Now,  is a completely arbitrary player. Hence, it follows that in deviations leading
to inclusive networks, there is no player in the player set  that is worse oﬀ. But
there is at least one player in the player set  who is strictly better oﬀ from the
definition of a profitable deviation. This contradicts that  is eﬃcient.
Proposition 1 immediately leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Under any component additive  and allocation rule  , an eﬃcient
network is link addition proof of any arbitrary order.
Proof. Link addition would only lead to inclusive networks. Hence, by Lemma 1,
the result follows.
Hence, starting from an eﬃcient network any profitable deviation must lead to
a non-inclusive network. Next, we identify another type of deviation that is not
profitable as well.
Definition 2 A player is said to isolate herself if she deletes all links in her neigh-
borhood.
It is fairly simple of show that starting from an eﬃcient network, isolation cannot
be a profitable deviation.
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Lemma 2 Let  be component additive and  =  . Given any eﬃcient network,
there cannot be any profitable deviation involving a player isolating herself.
Proof. The empty network always yields a value of zero. So any component of an
eﬃcient network must yield a non-negative value. Because otherwise value can be
increased by deleting all links in that component contradicting eﬃciency. Hence, each
player gets a non-negative payoﬀ. Isolation would always lead to a zero payoﬀ. So
isolation cannot be a profitable deviation.
By allowable deviations corresponding to a certain notion of stability, we mean
the processes of link addition/link deletion by a coalition of appropriate size such
that these processes do not yield profitable deviations for networks satisfying that
notion of stability. For instance, when we are talking of strong pairwise stability,
allowable deviations are link formation by coalitions of two players and link deletion
by coalitions of one. With regard to strong stability, allowable deviation would include
any conceivable deviation. Next, we can define deviation proof topologies.
Definition 3 A network architecture or topology is deviation proof with regard to
some allowable deviation if it is not possible to form non-inclusive networks without
isolation using such deviation.
Below in Table 1, we list deviation proof architectures for important types of
allowable deviations. Next, we have the following proposition. It is an extension of
Corollary 3.2 of Gilles et al. (2006).
Lemma 3 Let  be component additive and  =  . Then, if an eﬃcient network
has a deviation proof architecture, it is stable.
Proof. The only two things a coalition can do by deviating is either form an inclusive
network or isolate themselves. By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, neither is profitable.
Next, let us consider architectures such that if under a component additive value
function, they turn out to be eﬃcient, they must be stable as well. Let us call those
architectures as eﬃciency compatible. From Lemma 3, deviation proof architectures
are eﬃciency compatible. We show below that if a network is not deviation proof, we
can find value functions for which it is not eﬃciency compatible.
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Nature of Stability
Nature of allowable
deviation
All possible deviation
proof architectures
SLDP
Link deletion by
coalitions of size 1
Bi-connected networks
Strong pairwise stability
Link deletion by
coalitions of size 1,
link formation by
coalitions of size 2
Bi-connected networks
Link addition proofness
of order  > 2
Link addition
by arbitrary
coalitions of size
2 or more
All possible networks
Link deletion proofness
of order  > 2
Link deletion
by coalitions of
size 2 or more
Networks where
maximum size of each
non-null component
does not exceed 2
Stability of order  > 2
Simultaneous link
addition and link
deletion by coalitions of
size 2 or more
Empty network
Table 1
Lemma 4 Let  be component additive and  =  . Given a network that is not
deviation proof, we can find value functions for which it is not eﬃciency compatible.
Proof. Consider a network  that has an architecture that is not deviation proof
under the allowable deviation in question. We shall construct a value function under
which  may be eﬃcient but not stable. Hence, we show that it is not eﬃciency
compatible.
From Table 1, the allowable deviations must include link deletion because there
does not exist a network that is not deviation proof under link addition alone.
First, suppose there exists a component b ∈ () such that (b) > 3. Then
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there must exist a coalition  ⊂ (b) where || > 1 that can form a smaller non-
null component 0 by deleting links namely (0)  (b) such that  ⊂ (0)
This is obvious if allowable deviations include link deletion by coalitions of size 2 or
more. If link deletion by coalitions of only size 1 are allowed, then, by Table 1, the
network is not a bi-connected graph. Then take any critical player. By definition it
can form a smaller component by deleting an appropriately chosen set of links in its
neighborhood link-set.
Call the resulting network 0. Assign a value 1 to b and 0 to all other components,
if any in . Further, assign a value 1 to 0 and a value 0 to all components other
that 0 that are formed by link deletion by . Finally, assign values 0 to all other
networks. Then,  is an eﬃcient network. But for all  ∈ ,
(0 ) = 1(0) 
1
(b) = (b ) = ( )
Therefore,  is not stable.
Next consider a network  where the size of the largest component does not exceed
2 and  is not deviation proof with regard to the allowable deviation in question. We
know from Table 1 that there must be at least one non-null component because the
empty network is deviation proof for all possible allowable deviations. Further the
only allowable deviation for which this is not deviation proof is simultaneous link
formation and link deletion by coalitions of size 2 or more. Suppose,  = 3. Then 
consists of a component of size 2 and a singleton, say  = {12}. Then assign a value
1 to the any components 12 and 23 and zero to all other components. Then 2 and 3
can induce a profitable deviation by 2 deleting its link with 1 and forming a link with
3. Hence,  cannot be stable even though it is eﬃcient. The same logic can be used
to construct value functions under which any network with at least one singleton and
one non-null component is eﬃcient but not stable.
Finally consider a network  where all components have size 2. There must
necessarily be an even number of players. Consider an anonymous value function
and assign a value 1 to components of size 2 or less and a value 7
4
to a star component
of size 3. Let all other components earn zero value. The network is eﬃcient but not
stable since a coalition of 2 can form a star and earn a higher payoﬀ of 7
12
 1
2
.
Lemma 4 is making a somewhat obvious point. A deviation proof architecture
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is eﬃciency compatible. A non-deviation proof architecture is not guaranteed to be
eﬃciency compatible. The importance of the result lies in its negative implications.
Deviation proof networks are few. So, the kind of analysis pioneered by Gilles et. al.
(2006) cannot be extended to higher orders of stability.
3.2 Communication Networks: An Example
Communication networks were introduced by Myerson (1977) and subsequently elab-
orated upon, among others, by Owen (1986), Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001)
and Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005). Let  be a cooperative game. Hence,
() indicates the productive value of an arbitrary coalition  ⊂ 
Let us introduce the restriction that a coalition is productive only when all mem-
bers of the coalition can communicate with each other. Communication can take place
only along links in a communication network  and each link in this network incurs a
cost . This then allows one to define a value function that assigns to each network 
the productive value that the players can obtain when they have the communication
lines in  available, minus the cost of the network.
A given cooperative game  and a cost per link  lead to a value
 = X
∈Γ()
()−X
∈
.
In order to ensure that (∅) = 0, we limit ourselves to zero-normalized characteris-
tic functions, i.e. ({}) = 0 for each  ∈  . Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005)
show that if  is convex and symmetric, then a strongly stable and eﬃcient networks
exists. We can do away with both convexity and symmetry but impose the restric-
tion that  = 0 and prove that there exists an eﬃcient and strongly pairwise stable
network. The reason is obvious. If  = 0, value depends only on partitioning of the
player set Γ rather than the exact network structure. Therefore there exists a certain
partition that yields the highest value. One can always find a bi-connected network
that yields the eﬃcient partition by replacing each component of an eﬃcient network
by a completely intra-connected component. Such a network will be both eﬃcient
and strongly pairwise stable. The same cannot be said of any order of stability equal
to or higher than 2.
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Lemma 5 For 0, there always exists a network that is both eﬃcient and strongly
pairwise stable.
4 Component Size, Stability and Eﬃciency
4.1 Existence of Stable Networks and Eﬃciency
In this section, we will explore the relationship between stability and eﬃciency condi-
tional on the fact that one or the other exists but we shall make the additional rather
strong assumption of anonymity. Under these two assumptions, namely, component
additivity and anonymity of the value function and under the component-wise egal-
itarian allocation rule, Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) have shown that the
following facts are equivalent:
(i) A stable network of order  exists;
(ii) The set of stable and eﬃcient networks coincide;
(iii) The core of  is non-empty.
We extend the results to stability of any arbitrary order. First, we start with some
results that are not directly related to the question under investigation but will prove
useful later on. The proof of the proposition below is a straightforward extension of
Theorem 1 of Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005), but we show the proof for the
sake of completeness.
Proposition 1 Consider any anonymous and component additive value function .
If  is an anonymous, component decomposable and component balanced allocation
and  ∈ G is a network that is stable of order  with respect to  and  , then the
following would hold:
(a) If there is more than one component with size less than or equal to , then all
agents in those components earn identical payoﬀs.
(b) If there is any singleton, then all agents in components with size less than or equal
to  will earn zero payoﬀs.
(c) If there is any component with size less than or equal to  any agent in a compo-
nent of size greater than  will earn payoﬀs that is greater than or equal to those of
all agents in components of size less than or equal to .
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Proof. (a) Consider  and  that satisfy the above properties. Consider  ∈ G
which is stable of order . Towards a contradiction, let |()| > 2 and let there
exist two agents   ∈  ,  6=   ∈ ()  ∈ (0) with  0 ∈ () such that
( ) 6= ( ). Without loss of generality, assume ( )  ( ).
First, suppose  and  belong to diﬀerent components, namely,  6= 0. Consider a
deviation by()∪{}\{} so that so that  severs all links under , ()\{} severs
all links with  and()∪{}\{} forms a component 00 that is a duplicate of  with
 replacing . By anonymity and component decomposability, (00 ) = ( ) for
all  ∈ ()\{} and (00 ) = ( )  ( ). This contradicts stability of 
of order  since |() ∪ {}\{}| 6 
Next consider the situation where  and  belong to the same component, say,
0 = . Since |()| > 2 then there exists another component 000 6=  000 ∈ ().
Then there exists  ∈ (000) such that either ( ) 6= ( ) or ( ) 6= ( )
or both. In that case, we can replicate the above argument to show a contradiction.
(b) Let  ∈ 0(), namely  is a disconnected node or singleton and |()| > 1.
By component additivity of  and component balance of  , any singleton earns zero
payoﬀ. Hence ( ) = 0. First note that for all  ∈ (), ( ) > 0 because
otherwise  can sever all links and earn zero payoﬀs and gain contradicting deletion
proofness of order 1. Hence, towards a contradiction assume
max∈()∈()( )  0
Let  ∈ (0) and 0 ∈ () such that ( )  0. Consider a deviation by
(0)∪{}\{} where (0)\{} severs all links with  and (0)∪{}\{} forms a
component 00 that is a duplicate of 0 replacing  by . By component decomposabil-
ity and anonymity, (00 ) = ( ) for all  ∈ (0)\{} and (00 ) = ( ) 
( ) = 0. This contradicts stability of order  since |(0) ∪ {}\{}| 6 .
(c) Consider  and  that satisfy the above properties and let  ∈ G be stable of
order . Let |()| > 1 and |()\()| > 1. Let  ∈ () and 0 ∈ ()\()
and towards a contradiction
max∈()( )  min∈(0)( )
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Let
 ∈ argmax
∈()
( ) and  ∈ argmin
∈(0)
( )
Hence obviously, ( )  ( ). Now consider a deviation by () ∪ {}\{}
so that  severs all links under , ()\{} severs all links with , and () ∪
{}\{} forms a component 00 that is a duplicate of  replacing  with . By
component decomposability and anonymity, (00 ) = ( ) for all  ∈ ()\{}
and (00 ) = ( )  ( ). This contradicts stability of order  since |()∪
{}\{}| 6 
Next we introduce the notion of component-size which plays an important role
in resolving the conflict between stability and eﬃciency. The component-size of a
network is the size of the largest component in a network. Formally,
Definition 4 The component size of a network  denoted by
() = max∈Γ() || 
For stable networks of order , whose component-size is less than or equal to , the
component wise egalitarian allocation rule coincides with the egalitarian allocation
rule. If the network has more than one component, then it follows from Proposition
1 given that the component wise egalitarian allocation rule satisfies anonymity, com-
ponent balance and component decomposability. If it has a single component, it is
a immediate consequence of the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule. Next we
have the following proposition which is a straightforward extension of Theorem 2 of
Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005).
Proposition 2 (a) For a component additive and anonymous  and allocation rule
  if there exists an eﬃcient network of component-size less than or equal to , then
all stable networks of order  with component-size less than or equal to  (provided
they exist) must be eﬃcient.
(b) If there exists a network which is stable of order  and has a component-size less
than or equal to , then the -core of  is non-empty.
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Proof. (a) Let there exist an eﬃcient network of component-size less than or equal to
 and towards a contradiction, consider a stable network  of order  with component-
size less than or equal to  which is not eﬃcient. Then there exists 0 with component-
size less than or equal to  such that (0)  ()We claim that there exists 0 ∈ Γ(0)
such that (0(0))
|0| 
()
 
The claim can be proved as follows. Suppose not and let
(0())
|| 6
()
 for all  ∈ Γ(
0)
ThenX
∈Γ(0)
(0())
|| · || 6
X
∈Γ(0)
() · ||
 ⇒
X
∈Γ(0)
(0()) 6 ()⇒ (0) 6 ()
which is a contradiction. Now,
  ( ) = () for all 
Hence the coalition 0 can sever links with the rest of the network, form the network
0(0) and be better oﬀ. Since |0| 6 , this contradicts stability of order  of network
.
(b) Let the network  be stable of order  and have a component-size less than or
equal to . Then, we know
  ( ) = () for all 
Towards a contradiction, suppose the -core is empty. Then,  ( ) is not a -core
element. Then there exists  ⊂  with || 6  such that
()  X
∈
()

⇒ 
()
|| 
()
 . (11)
By the definition of , it follows that there exists some  ⊂  and 0 ⊂  with
 ∈ Γ(0) such that
(0( ))
| | 
()
  (12)
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The reason is suppose 0 ∈ argmax
⊂
(e). If for all  ∈ Γ(0), it is the case that
(0( ))
| | 6
()

then X
∈Γ(0)
(0( ))
| | · | | 6
X
∈Γ(0)
()
 · | |
⇒ (0) 6 () · ||
⇒ (
0)
|| 6
()

⇒ 
()
|| 6
()

which contradicts (11). Now | | 6  combined with (12) contradicts stability of order
 of .
The conditions imposed by Proposition 2(a) are rather stringent. There must
exist both a stable network of component size less than equal to  and an eﬃcient
network with component size less than or equal to  in order to ensure that at least
one stable network of order  is eﬃcient as well.
First, we show that if there does not exist an eﬃcient network of component-size
less than or equal to , then stable networks of order  are not necessarily eﬃcient.
Example 1 In this example, we show that there can be eﬃcient networks of component-
size greater than  which are not stable of order  even when the latter exist and have
component-size less than . Let  = {1 2 3 4}. Consider a component additive and
anonymous  and let ({  }) = 33, ({}) = −200, ({    }) = 4.
The empty network and all singletons yield zero value. Let all other network topolo-
gies yield zero value as well.
Under  , the empty network is stable of order 2 and has component-size less than
2. The eﬃcient network {    } is not stable of order 2 because the coalition
consisting of  and  can sever their link with  and be better oﬀ. Neither any stable
network (of order 2) is eﬃcient nor is any eﬃcient network stable of of order 2.
Next, we show that if there exists eﬃcient networks of component size less than
or equal to , then stable networks of order  with component size greater than  are
not necessarily eﬃcient.
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Example 2 In this example, we show that there can be stable networks of component-
size greater than  which are not eﬃcient even when there exist eﬃcient networks of
component size less than or equal to . Let  = {1 2 3 4 5 6}. Let  be component
additive and anonymous and ({}) = 038 Also, let the complete component con-
sisting of 5 players yield a value of 1. Let all other network topologies yield a value of
zero. The eﬃcient network is given by the network consisting of three components of
size 2. It yields a total value of 114 This network is stable of order 2 as well under
 .
However, there is another network that is stable of order 2, namely the network con-
sisting of a single complete component of size 5 and a singleton. It is ineﬃcient
because the total value produced is 1 which is less than 114 Each player gets 020
under   which is greater than 019 which they get in the eﬃcient network. In all
other networks, payoﬀs are zero. So no pair of players have any incentive to deviate
and form a diﬀerent network.
The next counter-example shows that existence of stable networks of order  with
component-size greater than  does not guarantee that the -core is non-empty.
Example 3 In this example, we show that the existence of stable networks of order 
with component size greater than  does not imply that -core of  is non-empty. Let
 = {1 2 3 4 5}  Let  be anonymous and component-additive and let there be two
possible network topologies that produce non-zero values. The complete component
of size 4 produces a value 1. The component (obviously complete) of size 2 produces
a value equal to 044. Towards a contradiction, suppose a 2-core allocation exists.
This implies by Lemma 6 (see below), that the allocation giving 02 to each player is
a 2-core allocation. But this allocation can be blocked by a coalition of 2 which is a
contradiction. But the reader can verify that the network that comprises of a complete
component of size 4 and a singleton is stable of order 2.
The above examples are meant to illustrate that we cannot strengthen the Propo-
sition 2 in any way. Let us now consider the converse question. When are eﬃcient
networks stable of order ? First, we show that an eﬃcient network of component-size
less than or equal to  is not necessarily stable of order .
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Example 4 In this example, we show that eﬃcient network of component size less
than or equal to  are not necessarily stable of order . Let  = {1 2     8}. Let 
be component additive and anonymous and a component which is a star network of
size 4 yields a value 4. Also, let any component with shape like that of 2 in Figure 1
yield value 7. Singletons yield zero value and so do all other network topologies. The
eﬃcient network is given by two star components of size 4. But it is not stable of
order 4 because the centers of stars can delete one link each, form a mutual link and
earn a higher payoﬀ of 76 which is greater than their payoﬀ in the eﬃcient network,
namely 1. In fact, in this example there does not exist any stable network of order 4.
Can the problem be resolved by existence of a stable network of order ? Namely,
if there exists a stable network of order , are all eﬃcient networks of component size
less than equal to  stable of order . If  = , Jackson and van den Nouweland
(2005) have shown that this is the case and they utilize the core properties of the
cooperative game  (see above) in order to show that.
However, their result cannot be extended in our context. Even if there exists a
stable network of order  with component-size less than or equal to , and an eﬃcient
network with component size less than or equal to , while it follows from Proposition
2(a) that the stable network must be eﬃcient, the converse is not true. There can be
eﬃcient networks with component size less than or equal to  which are not stable of
order . Below, we have a counter-example.
Example 5 In this example, we show that the mere existence of stable networks
of order  with component-size less than or equal to  does not guarantee that all
eﬃcient networks with component-size less than or equal to  are stable of order .
Let  = {1 2     8} and  be component additive and anonymous. Further, there
are three network topologies that produce a positive value (rest producing zero value).
A component which is a star of size 4 produces a value 4. A component which looks
like 4 below produces a value 4 as well.
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Hence, the eﬃcient networks are networks with two components such as 4 (say 4)
and networks with two components which are stars of size 4 (say 6). A network
with one component such as 5 and either two singletons or a component of size 2
produces a positive value as well, namely 7 but is ineﬃcient. Call a network with one
component such as 5 and two singletons 5. All other networks produce value less
than 7.
Now, we claim that 6 is stable of order 4 but 4 is not. In 4 and 6, each player
earns a payoﬀ of 1. In a network such as 5, every player belonging to a non-null
component earns a payoﬀ of 76. The only thing that needs to be checked is that if it
is possible to reach the network 5 by a coalition of size 4 (or less). The reader can
verify that this is indeed the case with 4 but not so with 6. In fact, starting from
6, it takes a coalition of at least 6 players to reach the network 5.
We note that this example does not contradict Proposition 2. There exists both one
stable network and two eﬃcient network of component size less than 4. By Proposition
2, the stable network must be eﬃcient which is indeed the case. But Proposition 2
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does not say that the eﬃcient network must be stable as well. Here one of the eﬃcient
networks is not stable.
We will end this subsection with a comment on Jackson and van den Nouweland’s
(2005) Theorem 2. If eﬃcient networks are not necessarily stable of order  even
when there exists stable networks of order  with component-size less than or equal
to , why does the result hold for  = ? Below, we prove a result that directly leads
to the aforesaid fact. We start with a lemma.
Lemma 6 Let  be component additive and anonymous. If the -core of  is non-
empty, then, the allocation b defined by b = () belongs to the -core.
Proof.  is anonymous and hence  is symmetric. Hence, the -core is symmetric
as well. The -core is convex by standard arguments. Therefore, taking any core
allocation and averaging over all its permutations leads to identical payoﬀs of 
()
 .
Then, we can prove the following proposition.
Lemma 7 Let  be component additive and anonymous. If the -core of  is non-
empty, then starting from any eﬃcient network with component-size less than or
equal to , there cannot be any profitable deviation that leads to another network with
component-size less than or equal to .
Proof. Let the network  be eﬃcient relative to  and have a component-size less
than or equal to . Suppose the -core of  is non-empty. Then, from Lemma 6,
the allocation b given by b = () belongs to the -core. Then,X
∈Γ()
(()) = () =X
∈
b
Further, since the component-size of  is less than or equal to , from the definition
of the -core, X
∈
b > () > (()) for each  ∈ Γ()
Hence, all weak inequalities must hold with equality and therefore for each  ∈ Γ()X
∈
b = (())
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Now, given that under b, each player gets equal payoﬀs, namely, b = b for each pair
 ,  6= , it implies
  ( ) = b for each  ∈  (13)
Now, consider any arbitrary network 0 with component size less than or equal to .
From the definition of the -core, it follows thatX
∈
b > () > (0()) for each  ∈ Γ(0)
⇒ 1||
X
∈
b > 1|| · (0())
⇒ b >   (0 ) (14)
since b = b for each pair  ,  6= .
From (13) and (14), it follows that
  ( ) >   (0 )
Therefore, the lemma follows.
We can combine Proposition 2(b) and Lemma 7 to get the following result.
Proposition 3 Let  be component additive and anonymous. If there exists a net-
work which is stable of order  and has a component-size less than or equal to , then
starting from any eﬃcient network with component-size less than or equal to , there
cannot be any profitable deviation that leads to another network with component-size
less than or equal to .
Any arbitrary network has component-size less than or equal to . So starting from
a certain network, if there cannot be any profitable deviation leading to a network
with component-size less than or equal to  it simply means that network is strongly
stable (or stable of order ) If  = , Proposition 3 translates to the fact that, if there
exists a strongly stable network, every eﬃcient network is strongly stable. This is
precisely part of Theorem 2 of Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) Also, Lemma
7 implies that if the core of  is non-empty, then every eﬃcient network is strongly
stable. Given that there always exists an eﬃcient network, it implies that if the core
of  is non-empty, then there exists a strongly stable network.
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Finally, note that the converse of Proposition 2(b) does not necessarily hold.
Namely, the -core can be non-empty but there need not exist any network that is
stable of order . To see this, reconsider Example 4. The allocation  = 1 for all
 ∈  belongs to the 4-core even though no stable networks exists.
We can summarize the results of this section as follows. For a given value function
 (which we assume is anonymous and component-additive), let () be the set of
eﬃcient networks and (  ) be the set of stable networks of order  under the
allocation rule  . Let
G = {|() = ())} = {|() 6 }
Hence, G ⊂ G denotes the set of networks with component-size less than or equal
to .
Then,
() ∩G 6= ∅⇒ (  ) ∩G ⊂ ();
(  ) ∩G 6= ∅⇒   ( ) >   (0 ) for all  ∈ () ∩G  0 ∈ G .
4.2 Convexity of Value Functions
The next question we shall tackle is what restrictions on value functions guarantee
the existence of at least one eﬃcient network that is stable of order .
From the above section, we have a suﬃcient condition:
(a) There exists at least one eﬃcient network of component size less than or equal
to  and
(b) There exists of at least one stable network of component-size less than or equal
to .
We call it the CS condition- 
Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) has given us another suﬃcient condition,
namely, top-covexity. A value function is top-convex if
()
 >
()
||
for all  ⊂  .
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Top convexity is both a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a strongly stable
network to exist and under this condition, the set of stable networks coincide with
the set of eﬃcient networks. Given that there must always exist an eﬃcient network,
top-convexity guarantees the existence of an eﬃcient and strongly stable network.
It immediately follows that top convexity guarantees the existence of an eﬃcient
network which is stable of order  for any arbitrary .
CS Condition-  is not necessarily weaker than top-convexity. Top-convexity guar-
antees existence of a stable network but not necessarily one with component-size less
than . In fact, neither condition implies the other. Value functions may satisfy top
convexity but not CS condition-. Also, value functions may also satisfy CS condition-
 but not top-convexity. When  =  do the two conditions coincide. Below, we have
two examples.
Example 6 Link monotone value functions: Consider a component additive and
anonymous value function which is strictly increasing in the number of links among
the players. Specifically, assume that each link increases value by a fixed amount
  0. Then,
() =  · P
∈
1
Then, the complete network is the unique strongly stable and eﬃcient network. Also,
()
|| =  ·
µ ||− 1
2
¶

Top-convexity is obviously satisfied. But the CS condition- is not satisfied for any
 except  =  This example also implies that CS condition- is not a necessary
condition for a stable network of order  to being eﬃcient.
Example 7 Let  = {1 2 3 4 5 6}. Consider an anonymous and component-
additive value function. Let a component of size 2 produce a value 2. Let a complete
component of size 5 produce value 55. Let all other network topologies produce zero.
Then, top-convexity is not satisfied since for any coalition  of size 5
()
|| = 11  1 =
()
 .
Consequently, there does not exist a strongly stable and eﬃcient network. But CS
condition-2 is satisfied which ensures existence of an eﬃcient network which is stable
of order 2.
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We can define a condition on value function (which is similar to top-convexity but
weaker) which is necessary and suﬃcient for the existence of the -core.
Definition 5 A value function is convex of order  if
()
 >
()
||
for all  ⊂  such that || 6 .
Then we have a lemma which is a direct extension of Jackson and van den Nouwe-
land’s (2005) Theorem 3.
Lemma 8 The -core of  is non-empty iﬀ the value function is convex of order .
Proof. Suppose the -core of  is non-empty. Then, by Lemma 6, b as defined
above belongs to the -core. Hence, for every  ⊂  with || 6 , it follows thatP
∈
b > ()
⇒ 
()
 >
()
|| 
This implies that  is convex of order .
For the converse let  be convex of order . Then,
()
 >
()
||
for all  such that || 6 . This implies
|| · 
()
 > 
()
⇒ P
∈
b > ()
for all  ⊂  such that || 6 . Hence, b belongs to the -core and so the -core
cannot possibly be empty.
Of course, convexity of order  is a necessary (from Proposition 2(b)) but not
suﬃcient condition for existence of a stable network of order . In Example 4, for
instance, the allocation of 1 to every player belongs to the 4-core where but there
does not exist any network that is stable of order 4. To summarize:
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(i) CS condition  is a suﬃcient but not necessary condition for existence of an
eﬃcient network that is stable of order .
(ii) Top convexity is a suﬃcient but not necessary condition for existence of an
eﬃcient network that is stable of order 
(iii) Neither of the two above conditions implies the other but the two conditions
coincide if  = .
(iv) Convexity of order  is necessary but not suﬃcient for existence of a stable
network of order .
5 Conclusion
In this paper we introduce stability of a finite order and examine its relationship
with eﬃcient networks. Stable networks of a finite order are those networks that are
immune to changes in terms of alterations in the existing structure of links when
only coalition not exceeding a certain size can be formed. We focus in this paper on
topologies or architectures of networks which if assumed by stable networks would
ensure these are eﬃcient and if assumed by eﬃcient networks would ensure these are
stable. Under component additivity of value functions and component-wise egalitar-
ian allocation rule, there are no significant network architectures which if assumed
by eﬃcient networks ensures that they are stable of order  (where  > 2) without
further restrictions on value functions. This contrasts with the results of Gilles et
al. (2006) who find a broad class of such architectures for strong pairwise stability,
namely, bi-connected graphs. Once we add anonymity, it holds that if there exists
at least one eﬃcient network with component-size less than or equal to , then all
stable networks of order  with component-size less than or equal to  must be ef-
ficient. We show using counter-examples that the results cannot be strengthened in
any way. From this result, we identify a set of suﬃcient conditions in terms of stable
and eﬃcient networks assuming certain architectures which we call CS condition-
which ensures there exists a network that is stable of order  and eﬃcient. These
condition coincides with top-convexity when  is equal to the total number of players
but otherwise neither follows from nor implies top convexity.
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